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fix(service-messaging, service-storage, service-settings, metadata-protocol): the remaining principal-less producers take the explicit system opt-in - #22025
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Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…elete doubles Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…or inside its callback Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
📓 Docs Drift CheckThis PR changes 4 package(s): 26 hand-written doc(s) name something this change touched — list omitted above 15 rows. Re-derive on the tree named below: ⛔ 9 release-owned page(s) also affected — read-only, see AGENTS.md Documentation Guardrails. What this run could not see
Coarse fallback — 23 page(s) merely mention a changed package (the pre-#9192 predicate, kept for the deliberately-wide backstop): Which tree this was computed onThis run read A worktree cut from an older # while this PR is open — GitHub drops the merge commit once it closes
git fetch origin 93638c07b785ff6a76638eab4ea952e6c0fcc873 && git checkout 93638c07b785ff6a76638eab4ea952e6c0fcc873
# afterwards, rebuild it from the two parents, which stay fetchable
git fetch origin 1fb274e61cfff12ede54963d779acdfd079be318 e2aa5ecaa0548e791ba50de3b9aec6838eaf241c && git checkout -B drift-repro 1fb274e61cfff12ede54963d779acdfd079be318 && git merge --no-ff e2aa5ecaa0548e791ba50de3b9aec6838eaf241c
node scripts/docs-audit/affected-docs.mjs --json 1fb274e61cfff12ede54963d779acdfd079be318
|
…otification delivered to that user (objectstack-ai#22037) Fixes objectstack-ai#22026 Clause-②: no (narrowing) A read receipt belongs to a recipient: ADR-0030 keys `sys_notification_receipt` by recipient. `MessagingService.markRead` is the method behind the notifications mark-read door and behind `markReadAsCaller`. It used to insert a `read` receipt for any notification id it was handed, stamped with that notification's organization, and never checked that the caller was a recipient. It now inserts one only for a notification that was delivered to that user. This follows triage's direction (`6022270298`) and the seat verdict on the measure-first round (`6023979476`, option A). Rows already written are not cleaned up; the verdict ruled that out. ## What changed Positions are at base `b88c356413`, in `packages/services/service-messaging/src/messaging-service.ts`. - **`upsertReadReceipt`** (near `:888`) keeps its first step: it flips a receipt keyed `(notification_id, user_id, channel 'inbox')` to `read` in place. That read is also the receipt half of the delivery check. The receipt key is the `delivered` receipt's key, so when the read finds nothing, there is no delivered receipt either. - **When nothing is found,** the new private `inboxMessageNames` checks for the inbox half. It reads the caller's own `sys_inbox_message` for that notification: `where: { user_id, notification_id }`, `fields: ['id']`, under `INBOX_SYSTEM_CONTEXT`. An inbox message is enough on its own, because the inbox channel's `delivered` receipt is best-effort: `writeDeliveredReceipt` logs a failure and moves on, and the inbox row stays. - **If neither half holds,** `upsertReadReceipt` returns 0. No row is written, `readCount` does not count the id, and `notificationOrganization` is not called. That organization read now happens only on the delivered path. - **If the inbox read throws,** the error reaches `markRead`'s existing per-id catch. It is logged at warn, the id counts 0, and no row is written. A check should fail in that direction. - **`markAllRead` is unchanged.** Its ids come from `unreadNotificationIds`, which reads the user's own inbox rows that carry a `notification_id`. So every id it passes already has an inbox message for that user. A pin below covers it. - **Doc comments.** The `markRead` docblock now says an undelivered id writes nothing. The `inbox-system-context.ts` docblock lists the new read among the calls that context carries; that edit is comment-only, in the same package. - **Unchanged:** the response shape `{ success, readCount }`. There is no spec, permission-set or `plugin-security` change, and nothing changes who may read what. ## Reachability, measured before the build Triage asked for this measurement first. It was taken on base `b88c356413` with a local engine-level probe: the real `SecurityPlugin`, `ObjectQL` and `SqlDriver`, the shipped permission sets, and the `isolated`, `group` and `single` postures. The probe was deleted and never committed. Classes and roles only: - **No reader in the stamped organization** reads a non-recipient's receipt row, by list or by id. That covers the member, the viewer, the org admin, and the platform admin with that organization active. The `_self` policy binds every authenticated principal on this object, and the object grants no superuser bypass. - **The stamp grants nobody a read.** Its only effect on reads: the writer cannot see their own wrongly stamped row on the generic data door. That row is the defect's own output, and this change stops producing it. - **The inbox's own reads** run under their user-keyed context, and the stamp does not reach them. Report: `6023938722`. Seat verdict: `6023979476`. ## Pins and ablation The pins are in `messaging-service.test.ts`, block `[objectstack-ai#22026]`. They use the file's existing stateful `inboxEngine` double, observed through spies, so no new double was added. - **The recipient half:** with an inbox message and no receipt, the receipt persists, is stamped with the notification's organization, and counts 1. - ⛔ **The non-recipient half,** for the same notification: the call returns `{ success: true, readCount: 0 }`. The receipt table stays empty, nothing is inserted, the event's organization is not read, and the recipient's state does not move. - ⛔ The same holds through `markReadAsCaller`. - A mixed call counts only the delivered id and writes only its receipt. - **The receipt half:** a delivered receipt with no inbox message is still flipped in place, as before. - The delivery check reads only the caller's own inbox: keyed on `user_id`, run with `{ isSystem: true }`, and projecting `id` alone. - **An inbox row with no `notification_id`:** a call naming its row id writes nothing, and the row still lists as unread. - **`markAllRead`:** only delivered ids are swept, by construction. The test counts 2 and finds receipts for that user only. **Fixture triage:** in `read-receipt-organization.test.ts` (pins E and E2), the reader had no delivery evidence. The fixture now gives them their inbox message, which is exactly the case the insert path exists for. The assertions are unchanged. **Ablation.** Run on the committed state `7eb0b82008` with `scripts/ablation-replace.mjs` in wrap mode: delete the delivery-check statement, run the block, restore. - The anchor count went 1 to 0, and the blob went `448159c99cee` to `ac84bbb73a43`. - 5 of the 8 pins turned red. The non-recipient half read `expected { success: true, readCount: 1 } to deeply equal { success: true, readCount: +0 }`. - The 3 that stayed green are the recipient half, the receipt half and `markAllRead`, which do not depend on the check. - After the restore, the blob matched HEAD `448159c99cee` and `git diff HEAD` was empty. objectstack-ai#22025's pins (`system-context.pin.test.ts`) are green and unchanged. ## Tests Head `f2d085db22` unless a line says otherwise. That commit merges `origin/main` `2301e17eaf`, a CI-script commit that touches none of these files. - **Builds.** `pnpm --filter '@objectstack/service-messaging^...' build` exited 0. `pnpm --filter @objectstack/service-messaging build` exited 0, with `check-dts-emitted: 2/2`. - **Package suite.** `pnpm --filter @objectstack/service-messaging test`: 48 files and 531 tests passed. `typecheck` exited 0, and `tsc --listFiles` shows its program includes all 48 test files, the two edited ones among them. - **Gates.** `node scripts/pm/dispatch-gates.mjs --commands`, run on this change with no paths, derives 65 commands: the dispatch's 51 plus 14 from the changeset and test-file families, none dropped. All 65 exit 0. The `--ran` reconciliation over the recorded exit codes reads "65 derived, 65 run, 0 NOT-MEASURED, 0 UNRUN". - **Two gates needed a build first.** In the first run, at `7eb0b82008`, `check:dual-build-cjs-loads` and `check:i18n` exited 3 (PREREQUISITE NOT MET: no build output). After a turbo build of the workspace (72 tasks, 71 cached), both exited 0, and they exit 0 at the merge head too. - **Verdict lines.** - `check-nul-bytes: OK`, no raw ASCII control bytes. - `check-adr-0087-registration` printed its no-migration-prescription exemption notice. - `check-empty-changeset`: "No empty-frontmatter changeset introduced by this diff". - `check-system-context-census: OK`. - `check-changeset-no-major` reads its level axis from the PR payload, so that half is answered in CI. - **Dogfood, at `7eb0b82008`** (the merge touched no package). These suites reach service-messaging through `dist/`, which was checked to contain the change: `approval-notification-body.dogfood.test.ts`, `schedule-acting-organization.dogfood.test.ts`, `schedule-sweep-organization-scope.dogfood.test.ts` and `platform-app-object-entry-views.test.ts`. 4 files and 84 tests passed. - **Runtime, through the real HTTP mark-read door, at `7eb0b82008`.** `notifications.hono.integration.test.ts` delivers through the real pipeline, marks one notification read (`readCount: 1`), then marks all read. Together with `notification-schema-conformance.test.ts` and `domains/notifications-query-validation.test.ts`: 3 files and 54 tests passed. - **Left to CI:** repo-wide lint, the whole-workspace type-check lanes, the Test Core shards and the full dogfood shards. ## Acceptance notes - **Comment drift in `plugin-security`, carrier: none.** In `default-permission-sets.ts`, the comment above `sys_inbox_message_self` says neither inbox object declares `organization_id`, so Layer 0 is inert on them. In fact the registry injects `organization_id` into `sys_notification_receipt` (it is engine-owned, not better-auth), and the tenant wall and the driver's native tenant scope do act on it, only ever narrowing. This is comment drift, not a behaviour defect. That file is not edited here. - **Rows written by the old path stay.** No non-system reader can read them, and they expire under the object's declared 90-day transient lifecycle. If the same user marks the same id read again, that existing row is flipped, as before: the flip path is unchanged by ruling. - **Inbox rows without a `notification_id`.** objectstack-ai#6448, which asked about such rows, ended in the not-planned state. `listInbox` looks up read state only through a row's `notification_id`, so a row without one always lists as unread. Nothing regresses for those rows. - **The changeset** is `minor` with a BREAKING banner (an accept-set narrowing, under the launch-window convention) and carries an ADR-0087 `not-required (no-migration-prescription)` disposition. --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu)_ Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…thods and the HTTP outbox's redeliver take the explicit system opt-in (objectstack-ai#22045) Part of objectstack-ai#21908 Clause-②: no Phase two, stage 2a of the principal-less hand-off closure (ADR-0096 E1 / D5), per the maintainer's ruling on the card (letter A). Seven more producers of a principal-less, non-system data context now take the explicit system opt-in (`isSystem: true`) inside their owning service. The deny itself lands last and is not in this PR, so objectstack-ai#21908 stays open. ⛔ No `plugin-security`, `packages/spec`, `metadata-protocol` or `docs/adr` file is in the diff, there is no new elevation API, and no door's authorization changed. ## What moved Positions are at the base `9a0401fdd3`. "Gate fired" means one of the six gates the security middleware still runs before its hand-off (package-managed, system-row, curated-capability, audience-anchor, ADR-0103 engine-owned, ADR-0090 D12 delegated-admin) fires on the producer's calls. Counts are principal-less calls at the hand-off, before and after the change; every "after" call arrived as an `isSystem` call. | Position | Function | Doors | Door authorizes (where) | Gate fired | Moved | Evidence (harness · dogfood subset) | | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | | `service-storage` `metadata-store.ts:373` | `StorageMetadataStore.getFile` | upload commit (`storage-routes.ts:453`), both download doors (`:799`, `:846`), and the chunked completion through `updateFile` | yes. Commit and chunked completion: session authentication (`requireUploadSession`, `:458`, `:684`) before the read. Downloads: `authorizeDownload` (`:808`, `:855`) after the read and before anything is disclosed, because its verdict reads the row | no | yes | 5 → 0 · 111 → 0 | | `metadata-store.ts:399` | `StorageMetadataStore.updateFile` | upload commit (`:472`), chunked completion (`:720`) | yes. Session authentication before the write; the session's organization scopes the write | no | yes | 2 → 0 · 46 → 0 | | `metadata-store.ts:434` | `StorageMetadataStore.deleteFile` | none. No production caller in this repository; the class is exported | not applicable, no door | no | yes | 1 → 0 (direct call) · not reached | | `metadata-store.ts:502` | `StorageMetadataStore.getSession` | chunk upload (`:593`), chunked completion (`:681`), progress (`:751`) | yes. Session authentication before the read; at the chunk door the resume-token check (`:617`) follows the read, because it reads the row's token, and precedes every write | no | yes | 8 → 0 · 2 → 0 | | `metadata-store.ts:529` | `StorageMetadataStore.updateSession` | chunk upload (`:658`, expiry via `:623`), chunked completion (`:705`, `:725`, expiry via `:694`, failure stamp via `:732`), progress (expiry via `:770`) | yes. Session authentication before every write; the chunk door also checks the resume token first | no | yes | 4 → 0 · 1 → 0 | | `metadata-store.ts:562` | `StorageMetadataStore.deleteSession` | none. No production caller in this repository | not applicable, no door | no | yes | 1 → 0 (direct call) · not reached | | `service-messaging` `sql-http-outbox.ts:468` | `SqlHttpOutbox.redeliver` (two reads, one reset write) | `POST /api/v1/webhooks/redeliver` (`plugin-webhooks` `webhook-outbox-plugin.ts:397`) through `MessagingService.redeliverHttp` | yes. An authenticated session or `401` before the call; the session's active organization is the tenant; the producer's veto runs before the write | no | yes | 3 → 0 · not reached | Read scope, asked for by the claim: `getFile` and `getSession` read by id with no organization scope before the move (no context at all, so no `tenantId` reached the driver, and the middleware handed the call through before any row or tenant filter) and after it (the middleware short-circuits before the same filters, and still no `tenantId` reaches the driver). ## What the opt-in would also have changed, and what holds it The opt-in skips more than the six gates. Measured on the real engine, per call: - **The update-side `readonly` strip.** `updateFile` and `updateSession` used to send the whole row read back, merged with the patch. Under the strip, the engine took `organization_id`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `created_by` and `updated_by` out of that row on every call. Under the opt-in the strip does not run, so the full row, `organization_id` included and read without tenant scope, would have been written back. **Fix inside the store:** the two updates now send the caller's patch alone (`changedColumns`). Measured on SQLite through the real engine: on the base the strip took those five columns; on the change it takes none, and the stored rows are equal on every non-timestamp column, with `updated_at` still stamped by the platform. - **The tenant-audit fill-in.** For an `isSystem` write, `ObjectQL.buildDriverOptions` fills in `bypassTenantAudit: true` when the object is outside the platform tenancy inventory. `sys_file` and `sys_upload_session` are in it as tenant-scoped, so nothing changes for them (pinned). `sys_http_delivery` is not, so the opt-in would have silenced the audit for a redelivery from a caller with no organization, which is the one line `RedeliverOptions` keeps. **Fix inside the outbox:** the reset write states `bypassTenantAudit: false`. The engine never overwrites an explicit value, and the driver still audits. - **Unchanged, measured or read:** row and field security, the masker and the Layer 0 tenant wall are skipped by the hand-off and by the opt-in alike. Read auditing records neither (no user id). No lookup field exists on the three objects, so the referential-integrity skip does not apply. Redelivery's bulk data event publishes without an organization in both cases. ## Pins - **Store, `tenant-audit-update-delete-half-repairs.test.ts`.** - Every by-id read carries `{ context: { isSystem: true } }` and no tenant. - Every by-id write carries the opt-in beside the door's tenant, or the opt-in alone with no tenant invented. The route-level pins are updated to match. - ⛔ An update payload never carries the provisioned columns of the row read back. - The opt-in leaves these writes' tenant audit armed. - ⛔ Negative, through the real `ObjectQL` over a real `SqlDriver` on SQLite in the isolated posture: under the opt-in, a door tenant's `updateFile`, `updateSession`, `deleteFile` and `deleteSession` on a row stamped for another organization are refused (`StorageMetadataStoreError` wrapping `RECORD_NOT_FOUND`) and leave the row untouched. The still-works half shows the caller's own row and an organization-less row are reached. - **Outbox, `system-context.pin.test.ts`.** Both reads and the reset write carry the opt-in. The caller's `tenantId` stays on every bag. The reset states `bypassTenantAudit: false`, and a caller with no tenant gets none invented. - **Outbox, `delivery-update-tenant-audit.integration.test.ts`.** - ⛔ Negative, on the real driver: a foreign row stays `RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND` with zero writes under the opt-in, and the caller's own row resets. - The two existing audit assertions now read `false`, the value the driver receives, where they read "absent". - **The stage-1 pins stay green.** These are objectstack-ai#22025's insert pins and objectstack-ai#22037's inbox pins, inside the full package suites. **Ablations**, run at `0f6df0f306`. Each mutation went through `scripts/ablation-replace.mjs`: the anchor hit, the blob changed, and the restore was proved by blob equal to `HEAD` and an empty `git diff HEAD`. The pins import from `src`, so no `dist` leg applies. | # | Mutation | Result | | :-- | :-- | :-- | | A1 | by-id writes keep the opt-in but drop the door tenant | 13 of 28 red; the negative pins read "promise resolved … instead of rejecting" (the foreign row was reached) | | A3 | `updateFile` sends the merged row again | 1 of 28 red; the payload carried `organization_id` and `created_by` | | A4 | `redeliver`'s deciding read drops `tenantId` | 5 of 30 red; the negative pin got `DELIVERY_NOT_ELIGIBLE` where it expects `RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND` | | A5 | the reset write's `bypassTenantAudit: false` removed | 4 of 21 red; the driver received `true` ("expected true to be false"), and the tenant-less redelivery went silent | ## Measurement The measurement used a local instrument in `plugin-security`'s middleware, never committed. Its instrument file was reverted, and blob `5b4ab28045af` equals `HEAD`. `plugin-security` was rebuilt, and `ablation-dist-preflight --absent` passes; its positive control found the marker in 2 built files while it was live. For each call from the seven producers, the instrument recorded the producer frame, whether the call was principal-less, and a dry run of the six gates with the system flag cleared. Two runs used it: - A scratch harness, deleted and not in the diff. It drove every door on a booted stack: upload commit, both downloads, the chunk upload, progress, chunked completion, progress on an expired session, and `POST /api/v1/webhooks/redeliver`. It called `deleteFile` and `deleteSession` directly. - The 11-file dogfood subset named below. Every door answered the same on the base and on the change (200, or 302 for the redirect). There were 0 gate firings before and after. ## Acceptance notes - **Premise correction.** `updateFile` and `updateSession` already accepted the optional organization context (`metadata-store.ts:399`, `:529`), as `deleteFile` and `deleteSession` did. Only `getFile` and `getSession` take none, and they still take none: the reads carry the opt-in without a tenant. No public signature changed. - **Door ordering, reported for the seat.** At both download doors the read precedes `authorizeDownload`. At the chunk door the read precedes the resume-token check. Each check reads the row it needs, and each precedes any disclosure and any write. The read's reach is the same before and after (unscoped by principal and by organization). - **Doors without a door-level binding.** The chunked completion and progress doors authorize by session authentication and check no resume token. The commit door checks no ownership of the file id. The move leaves all three unchanged, and owner checks are the question the ruling sent to its own card (option C). Reported to the seat at class level. - **`deleteFile` and `deleteSession` have no caller in this repository.** They were moved as the ruling wires all seven. Their door check is vacuous. - **Files beyond the two named files, all in the same packages.** - `outbox-dispatcher-scope.ts` declares `REDELIVER_SYSTEM_CONTEXT` (module-internal) with its own warrant, and amends the two docblocks that kept the outbox opt-ins off `redeliver`. - `messaging-service.ts` gets one sentence made true. - `scripts/engine-double-contract.pinned.json` counts the storage test file's second double, which `--write` grew. - `plugin-audit`'s `audit-writers.test.ts` fixture prose still describes `updateSession` writing the merged full record. That is test residue in another package and is left alone. ## Verification (head `2665532dc9`) Each command ran in the foreground of this worktree, and its exit code was captured before any pipe. - **Gates.** Running `node scripts/pm/dispatch-gates.mjs --commands --repo objectstack-ai/objectstack` at `2665532dc9`, with no paths, derived 73 commands. The dispatch-time 51 are a subset. All 73 ran and all exited 0. The reconciliation (`--ran`) printed: "73 derived famil(ies) accounted for — 73 run, 0 NOT-MEASURED (a DERIVED zero — all 73 recorded an exit code and none of them is 3)". - On an earlier pass at `6f366adcb1`, `check:engine-double-contract` exited 1. It had counted the new recording wrapper as a fake engine. The wrapper now routes each verb through the engine's dispatch predicates, and `--write` grew the ledger. - `check:dual-build-cjs-loads` exited 3 (PREREQUISITE NOT MET: 8 packages outside the dogfood closure had no `dist/`). They were built, and it then exited 0. - **Suites at `2665532dc9`.** `@objectstack/service-storage`: 42 files, 659 tests passed. `@objectstack/service-messaging`: 48 files, 534 passed. `typecheck` passed for both, the storage test layer's `check:test-typecheck` included. `--listFiles` confirms both programs compile the edited test files. `@objectstack/plugin-webhooks`, which mounts the redeliver door, passed at `0f6df0f306`: 15 files, 165 tests. - **Dogfood.** The 11 files below passed, 100 passed and 1 skipped, on both the base and the change. They ran against the change's built `dist/`; the source is unchanged since `230ed9ea15`. The files: `attachments-permission-matrix`, `attachments-public-read-acl`, `attachments-unscoped-delete-gate`, `field-file-collection`, `file-field-constraint-refusal`, `sys-file-metadata-write-refusal`, `predicate-write-unreadable-not-matched`, `write-door-unreadable-is-not-found`, `storage-growth`, `temporal-storage-e2e`, `webhook-materialization`. None of these files reaches the redeliver door; the scratch harness covered it. - **Lint, a proven narrowing; CI runs the full `pnpm lint`.** The population was read from `eslint.config.mjs`: the `**/*.{ts,tsx,mts,cts,js,jsx,mjs,cjs}` block plus the `packages/**` blocks. `eslint --no-inline-config --format json` over the 7 changed `.ts` files reported 7 files, 0 errors and 0 warnings at `c4f10218af`. The config enables no type-aware linting (no `parserOptions.project` and no typed rules), so no untouched file's verdict can move. ## Changeset `.changeset/21908-by-id-producers-opt-in.md` grades `patch` for `@objectstack/service-storage` and `@objectstack/service-messaging`. It names the opt-in, the patch-only update payload and the held tenant audit. No exported type or entry symbol changed: the new constants and the store helper are module-internal. --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu)_ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Part of #21908
Clause-②: no
Stage 1 of the closure of the security middleware's principal-less hand-off (ADR-0096 E1 / D5). Every producer this stage names now passes the explicit system opt-in that already exists (
isSystem: true) on its data-engine calls. The deny itself is stage 2 and is not in this PR, so #21908 remains open. ⛔ Noplugin-security,packages/spec,packages/qaordocs/adrfile is in the diff, and there is no new elevation API.What moved
Positions are at the base
9c3bec0f4d. "Gate fired" means one of the six gates the middleware still runs before its hand-off (package-managed, system-row, curated-capability, audience-anchor, ADR-0103 engine-owned, ADR-0090 D12 delegated-admin) threw on the producer's calls today. Probe counts are principal-less records at the hand-off, before → after the change; each "after" call arrived as anisSystemcall instead.service-messagingmessaging-service.ts:536,:639MessagingService.listInboxwindow read andcountUnreadTotalmessaging-service.ts:671readReceiptStatesmessaging-service.ts:858unreadNotificationIds(mark-all-read)messaging-service.ts:881upsertReadReceipt: receipt read, update, insert (mark-read)messaging-service.ts:953notificationOrganizationservice-storagemetadata-store.ts:319StorageMetadataStore.createFile(sys_fileinsert)metadata-store.ts:438StorageMetadataStore.createSession(sys_upload_sessioninsert)service-messagingrecipient-resolver.ts:180RecipientResolver.resolveOwnerOfrecipient-resolver.ts:150,:164resolveRole,resolveTeamsql-outbox.ts:89,:217,:352SqlNotificationOutbox.enqueue,ack,listsql-http-outbox.ts:129/:158(sharedinsert,:162),:352,:413,:430SqlHttpOutbox.enqueue/recordUndeliverable,ack,ackById,listemail-channel.ts:186,sms-channel.ts:135resolveRecipientreads (first read and the address-only retry)messaging-service.ts:1296findEventByDedupKey(the emit dedup lookup)template-renderer.ts:113NotificationTemplateStore.loadservice-settingssettings-service-plugin.ts:396sys_secretstore:insert,get,updateupdatehas no caller; unit-pinned)settings-service.ts:2635SettingsService.readStoredHandlemetadata-protocolsys-metadata-repository.ts:520,:1185,:1300,:1377SysMetadataRepository.getByHash,list,history,replayFromHistoryStatic half. All six gates act on writes only (
insert/update/delete/transfer/restore/purge), each on a closed set of objects:sys_permission_set,sys_position,sys_capability,sys_position_permission_set, the RBAC link tables andsys_member. The engine-owned guard refuses only a write whose context carries a user id, which none of these calls carried before or carries now. No moved call writes any object in those sets; the reads (includingresolveRole'ssys_memberread) are outside every gate by verb.Measured half. A local, uncommitted instrument sat in
plugin-security's engine middleware. For each principal-less, non-system context it recorded the producer frame (the first frame inside these four packages), any gate that threw, and the outcome shape after the hand-off. For eachisSystemcall from these packages it dry-ran the six gates with the flag cleared, then recorded the outcome shape. Two runs, before and after the change:Results: 0 gate throws before, and 0 gates would fire on any moved call after. Principal-less records attributed to these packages went 64 → 1 in the harness (the 1 is the harness's own deliberate context-less comparison write) and 178 → 129 in the dogfood subset. Of the 129 that remain, 128 are the rows below that this stage does not move; the other is the
createSessioninsert, which moved after that run. Outcome shapes per call are equal before and after, except where the Q2 change adds theowner_of:delivery. The instrument was reverted (security-plugin.tsblob5b4ab28045afequals HEAD),plugin-securitywas rebuilt, andablation-dist-preflight --absentpasses. The positive control was the marker present in 2 built files while the instrument was live.The rulings, and how each one holds
where: { user_id }. The receipt a mark-read inserts is stamped with thatuser_id. The receipt it updates is addressed by the id that auser_id-keyed read of the same call returned, and by nothing else.notificationOrganizationreads onesys_notificationevent row, which names no recipient, by id, projectingidandorganization_id, and uses it only as the stamp on the caller's own receipt.createFilestampsowner_idwith the user the door resolved from the session. Both inserts still hand the acting organization to the driver astenantId. Under the opt-in the organizations plugin's fill-only stamp stands down, so this channel is now the only stamper, and a pin holds it there.resolveOwnerOftakes the same opt-in its siblingresolveEmailcarries. It projectsidplus the owner fields, and only the owner id leaves the resolver. Measured on a booted showcase stack, for anowner_of:audience on aprivateobject: on9c3bec0f4d, 0 recipients, andemit()delivered 0. On this change, 1 recipient (the record's owner), andemit()delivered 1. Nothing the read returns appears in whatemit()answers.Other engine behaviour keyed on the flag (checked per moved call)
isSystemwrite. None of the moved writes supplies a non-readonly reference field: the receipt, delivery,sys_file,sys_upload_sessionandsys_secretcolumns these writes fill are text, number or json. So there is no skipped refusal to restore.sys_secretstore'supdate. It writesciphertext, which is declared read-only. Without a context the strip dropped it, and under the opt-in the value is written. This was measured on the real engine in the harness. That is what the member promises ("replace an existing secret row"), and no caller in this repository reaches it.sys_object here. The only business-object read isresolveOwnerOf, which is the ruled Q2 change.Found by this build, not moved (listed for the seat)
service-storageStorageMetadataStore:getFile(:342),updateFile(:368),deleteFile(:403),getSession(:469),updateSession(:496),deleteSession(:529). They are principal-less today (dogfood subset: 83sys_filereads, 39 updates, 3 session calls; 0 gate throws) and reached from the upload and download doors. The Q1 ruling namescreateFileonly. These read and write by id with no user term, so the ruling's user-id pin has nothing to hold, and their posture is the same class of decision. The deny needs a route for them.service-messagingSqlHttpOutbox.redeliver(:456): principal-less (its tenant rides the driver bag, not a context) and request-reachable. Its own documentation keeps the outbox opt-ins off it. Same class of decision.metadata-protocolprotocol.tspromoteDraftForPublishstill readssys_metadataprincipal-less (3 dogfood records). That file is another lane's, so it is listed only.Pins and ablations
service-messagingsystem-context.pin.test.ts(it extends the double security(service-settings, service-messaging, service-datasource, plugin-webhooks): plumbing reads and writes reach the engine with no principal and no system opt-in — the services-lane producers of #21908's closure #21913 pinned):isSystem, every user-row read is keyed on the user id, the insert is stamped with it, and the update addresses only a returned id.emit()carrying none of the record's values.service-storage:{ tenantId, isSystem: true }, and{ isSystem: true }alone where the caller has no organization (no organization is invented).owner_iddoes not reach the insert.tenantId.service-settingssettings-system-context.pin.test.ts: the store's four verbs, and a rotation whose write, update and post-update verification read all carryisSystem.metadata-protocolprotocol.platform-store-system-opt-in.test.ts:getByHash,list,historyand thewatchreplay.Each ablation was run through
scripts/ablation-replace.mjs, which confirms the anchor hit and the mutation landed, runs the suite, and restores with the blob equal to HEAD and an emptygit diff HEAD. The pins import their subjects fromsrc, so no build sat in between. All went red:listInboxloses itsuser_idtermisSystem: falseresolveOwnerOf's opt-in dropped (context: undefined)resolveOwnerOfalso returns a record valuefalsesys_secretstore's insert loses its opt-inreadStoredHandle's opt-in droppedisSystemowner_idfrom the bodygetByHash's opt-in droppedfalsefalseTests
Gates, at
e2aa5ecaa0(this PR's head):dispatch-gates --commands --repo objectstack-ai/objectstackderives 106 commands, and the dispatch-time list's 53 are among them. All 106 ran and exited 0.--ranreports "106 derived famil(ies) accounted for — 106 run, 0 NOT-MEASURED (a DERIVED zero — all 106 recorded an exit code and none of them is 3)".db67da722d),check:where-matcherwent red on the new pin's matcher, because it refused a combinator outside its callback. That is fixed here.check:skill-examplesandcheck:dual-build-cjs-loadsfirst refused withPREREQUISITE NOT MET: thespecdist was stale after the merge, and eight unrelated packages had no dist. They were built, and both re-ran green.Package suites, local:
service-messaging48 files / 523 tests,service-storage42 / 652,service-settings36 / 628,metadata-protocol218 files + 3 skipped / 28,043 tests passed.typecheckexits 0 for all four (service-storageincludes itscheck:test-typecheck).Dogfood, at
db67da722dand before the change. The 16 files areapproval-notification-body,schedule-acting-organization,schedule-sweep-organization-scope,webhook-materialization,platform-app-object-entry-views,attachments-permission-matrix,field-file-collection,file-field-constraint-refusal,sys-file-metadata-write-refusal,parent-derived-write-refusal-not-visible,predicate-write-unreadable-not-matched,route-ledger-live-mount-parity,write-door-unreadable-is-not-found,settings-config-change-audit,flow-credential-channelandobject-designer-field-reorder. They ran 16 passed, 185 tests passed and 1 skipped, both before and after.Lint, as a proven narrowing (CI runs the full
pnpm lint). The population is read fromeslint.config.mjs(**/*.{ts,…}plus thepackages/**objects).--no-inline-config --format jsonover the 20 changed.tsfiles gives 20 files, 0 errors and 0 warnings. The config enables no type-aware linting, so this diff cannot move a verdict on any untouched file.Acceptance notes
createSessionmoved withcreateFile. Row 16's census text names both inserts, and the existing pin holds the two inserts' contexts equal. The upload-session row has no user column. It is bound to the caller's file byfile_id, and that file carriesowner_id.check:tenant-audit-censusneededdocs/audits/2026-08-tenant-audit-write-call-sites.counts.mdand the generated block ofcontent/docs/permissions/tenant-audit-census.mdxregenerated, and the page's hand-written figures follow the census: threading 164 → 171, unreadable 60 → 54, decidably elevated 121 → 123.check:system-context-census --fixmoved theisSystemcensus page's declaration count 26 → 27, for the internal helper's return type.scripts/engine-double-contract.pinned.jsongained two rows (--write) for the settings pin's newupdate/deletedoubles.privateobject, 0 recipients on the base and 1 on this change". No package in this surface composesplugin-sharingwithservice-messaging, andservice-messagingdeliberately carries no plugin dependency. The committed pins hold the opt-in, the projection and the id-only result. A composed pin belongs where both plugins compose.main. That commit editsmetadata-protocolprotocol.tsonly, and no file here.Generated by Claude Code